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Wednesday, May 17, 2023

Directive #06-23 - Guardianships of Incapacitated Adults - Revised Background Screening Policy for Proposed Guardians

  

Directive #06-23 - Guardianships of Incapacitated Adults - Revised Background Screening Policy for Proposed Guardians 

      Proposed guardians are also required to self-disclose and certify to any criminal and civil judgment history, acknowledge receipt of and compliance with the policy, and provide periodic reports to the court of any changes to their criminal and civil judgment history. Individuals with any relevant negative history are provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard by the court as to whether the information discovered would affect the individual's ability to perform the duties of a guardian.

Original source

https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/2023/04/n230419b.pdf

 

The revised policy presumptively exempts certain categories of proposed guardians from the background screening process. These now include people appointed by the court as guardian when an incapacitated person was a minor, as well as attorneys appointed in their professional capacity. However, as before, the court may require any proposed guardian to undergo background screening as a prerequisite to appointment based on the individual facts of the case, including but not limited to the value of the guardianship estate. Further, the revised policy establishes that parents, spouses, or appointed guardians who are proposed as guardians must file an affidavit or certification setting forth their criminal and civil judgment history for the prior ten years. It also specifies that special medical guardianships are not within the scope of the policy. Finally, it revises certain operational provisions to refine the screening process.

Rule Amendments and Revised Forms

     The revisions to the policy are reflected in the amendments to Rule 4:86-2(b)(3), as adopted by the Court by order dated April 5, 2023 to be effective May 1, 2023 (Attachment 2).

         Consistent with the revised policy and the rule amendments, two forms - the Certification of Criminal and Civil Judgment History (CN 12706) (Attachment 3) and the Order Fixing Guardianship Hearing Date and Appointing Attorney for Alleged Incapacitated Person (CN 12013) (Attachment 4) - also have been revised.

 

Guidance on the Screening Policy Process

The screening process involves six steps, as summarized below and detailed in the revised policy:

1. Certification of Criminal and Civil Judgment History

1 When a guardianship complaint is filed, the proposed guardian will file a Certification of Criminal and Civil Judgment History (Attachment 3). Expunged criminal records are deemed not to have occurred and shall not be disclosed in the certification. If no proposed guardian is identified at the time of filing of the complaint, the certification must be filed as soon as a proposed guardian is identified, or before entry of the Judgment of Incapacity and Appointment of Guardian. 

2 The certification may be supplemented up to the time of qualification and acceptance of appointment. 

C. Proposed guardians who are subject to the policy will receive a copy of the policy with the Order for Hearing and must acknowledge receipt within five (5) business days of receipt. Personal identifiers provided with the acknowledgment form will be used only for the background screening and not for any other purpose.

2. Fingerprinting and Criminal History Check

3 When the Order for Hearing (Attachment 4) is entered, court staff will coordinate with County Sheriff's departments to perform fingerprint checks of proposed guardians who are New Jersey residents. Fingerprinting may be conducted in the county of venue, or in any other New Jersey county if travel or other factors make fingerprinting in the county of venue prohibitive. Fingerprinting must be completed within sixty (60) days of filing the complaint, with failure to do so resulting in automatic disqualification absent exigent circumstances. 

4 Proposed guardians residing out of state will undergo a Computerized Criminal History (CCH) check.

Directive #06-23 - Guardianships of Incapacitated Adults - Revised Background Screening Policy for Proposed Guardians April 14, 2023
Page 4 of 5

C. The fingerprint or CCH check results may be confidentially shared with the Probate judge, the County Surrogate and/or their designees, as well as with counsel for the alleged incapacitated person.

3. Judiciary Systems Check and Certified Judgment Search

A. Proposed guardians also will be screened by searching certain Judiciary systems.

B. The Probate judge also has discretion to require a certified judgment search based on factors including but not limited to the value of the guardianship estate.

C. The results of the Judiciary systems searches and certified judgment search, if applicable, may be confidentially shared with the Probate judge, the County Surrogate and/or their designees, as well as with counsel for the alleged incapacitated person.

4. After receipt of the screening results, the Probate judge will review the information to determine whether it contains any relevant adverse or negative history.

A. The policy sets forth nine factors to be evaluated by the Probate judge in determining whether the proposed guardian's relevant screening results may adversely relate to their ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of guardianship.

I    Proposed guardians whose relevant negative history may preclude them from appointment will be entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard on the record as to why the check results would not adversely impact their ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of guardianship. The hearing shall be conducted in open court unless the underlying matter was a closed proceeding, and the record of the hearing shall not be sealed unless the record of the underlying matter was sealed. However, the Probate judge may seal the record of the hearing upon request for good cause shown. 

II   Fingerprint and certain Judiciary systems search results will be destroyed. 

Directive #06-23 - Guardianships of Incapacitated Adults - Revised Background Screening Policy for Proposed Guardians April 14, 2023
Page 5 of 5

5. No later than the time of entry of the Judgment of Incapacity and Appointment of Guardian, the appointed guardian must execute an acknowledgment of compliance with the policy. At qualification, the appointed guardian must sign the Acceptance of Guardianship and Acknowledgment of Guardian Background Screening and Training.

6. The appointed guardian has an ongoing duty to comply with the policy and to disclose any changes to criminal or civil judgment history in periodic reports required pursuant to N.J.S.A. 38: 12-42.

Conclusion

Any questions related to this directive or the updated policy, amended rules, or revised forms should be directed to the Civil Practice Division at (609) 815-2900 ext. 54900 or civilwebsites.mbx@njcourts.gov.

Attachments:

(1) Revised Background Screening Policy for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults
(2) Amendments to Rule 4:86-2, effective May 1, 2023 (3) Revised form Certification of Criminal and Civil Judgment History (CN 12706)

(4) Revised form Order Fixing Guardianship Hearing Date and Appointing Attorney for Alleged Incapacitated Person (CN 12013)

Attachment 1

Revised Background Screening Policy for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults

New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised)

G Authority 
N.J.S.A. 3B: 12-25; R. 4:86; National Probate Court Standard 3.3.12; N.J.A.C. 13 :59-1.1 et seq.; 28 C.F .R. part 20 

H Applicability 
This policy is applicable to all proposed guardians of incapacitated adults in matters adjudicated in the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, Probate Part, except the following: 

                        Individuals who are the parents in a parent and child relationship with an alleged incapacitated person, as "parent and child relationship" is defined by the New Jersey Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9: 17-39, or who were appointed legal guardians of an alleged incapacitated person prior to their reaching majority pursuant to an order of the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part; 

                        Individuals who are married to an alleged incapacitated person in accordance with N.J.S.A. 37:1-29 et seq., in a civil union with an alleged incapacitated person as defined by N.J.S.A. 37:1-29, or in a domestic partnership with an alleged incapacitated person as defined by N.J.S.A. 26:8A-3; 

                        Pendente lite temporary guardians appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:12-24.l(c); 

                        Agencies authorized to act pursuant to P.L.1985, c. 298 (C.52:27G-20 et seq.), P.L.1985, c. 145 (C.30:6D-23 et seq.), P.L.1965, c. 59 (C.30:4-165.1 et seq.) and P.L.1970, c. 289 (C.30:4-165.7 et seq.); 

I    E. Public officials appointed as limited guardians of the person for medical purposes for individuals in psychiatric facilities listed in R.S.30: 1-7; 
New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy
for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised) (Corrected) 
Promulgated April 14, 2023 by Directive #06-23 Page 1 of 11 

III.

III Banks, trust companies, credit unions, savings and loan associations, or other financial institutions duly licensed or authorized to conduct business under applicable state or federal laws; and 

IV            Attorneys admitted to practice law and in good standing in the State of New Jersey who are appointed by the court in their professional capacity. 

V Notwithstanding the above provisions (A) through (G), the court may require any proposed guardian to undergo background screening as a prerequisite to appointment based on the individual facts of the case, including but not limited to the value of the guardianship estate. 

Scope

These procedures establish guidelines governing screening of proposed permanent guardians, substitute guardians, and successor guardians of incapacitated adults in matters adjudicated in the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, Probate Part. These include proposed general and limited guardians of the person; of the estate; and of the person and estate. These do not include special medical guardianships adjudicated in the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, General Equity.

Policy and Procedures

D All proposed guardians will be provided with a copy of the Judiciary's Background Screening Policy for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults by the Surrogate. The proposed guardians must complete, sign, and return to the Surrogate an acknowledgment of receipt of the policy within five (5) business days of receipt. The acknowledgment form shall be filed as part of the court record. 

E  Personal identifiers provided with the acknowledgment form will be used only for the background screening and not for any other purpose. 

F  All proposed guardians except those who are exempt from the policy pursuant to provisions II.(C) through (H) above must attach a 
New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy 

for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised) (Corrected)

Promulgated April 14, 2023 by Directive #06-23 Page 2 of 11

IV.

Certification of Criminal and Civil Judgment History to their complaint. TheCertificationofCriminalandCivilJudgmentHistory shall be in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. The certification may be supplemented at any time up to the time of qualification and acceptance of appointment. If no proposed guardian has been identified at the time of the filing of the complaint, the certification shall be filed no later than prior to the entry of judgment of legal incapacity and appointment of guardian. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-27, expunged criminal records are deemed not to have occurred and shall not be disclosed.

H A criminal history background screening check will be performed upon all proposed guardians who are subject to the policy prior to qualification and acceptance of the appointment. The background check will be in the form of a fingerprint check performed by the county sheriff's department for the vicinages. The fingerprint check may be conducted in the county of venue, or in any other New Jersey county if travel or other factors make fingerprinting in the county of venue prohibitive. 

I    The fingerprint check should be conducted within sixty (60) days of thedateoffilingofthecomplaint. Failuretodosowillresultin automatic disqualification of the proposed guardian(s) absent exigent circumstances. 

J   In the event that a proposed guardian is not available to submit to a fingerprint in New Jersey because he/she resides outside of the State, a Computerized Criminal History (CCH) check will be used as a screening too1. 

K Electronic Reception of the Fingerprint Reports 

1                   The vicinage Human Resources Division Manager or his/her designee may receive the electronically transmitted copy of the fingerprint reports. 

2                   Hard copies of the fingerprint reports may be made and 
New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy 

for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised) (Corrected)

Promulgated April 14, 2023 by Directive #06-23 Page 3 of 11

confidentially shared with the Probate Part judge, the Surrogate, and/or his/her designee, as well as with counsel for the alleged incapacitated person.

1 Hard copies of the fingerprint reports may also be made and confidentially shared with Counsel to the Administrative Director at the Administrative Office of the Courts and/or his/her designee. 

2 No electronic copies of fingerprint reports may be made and/or distributed. 

3 Pursuant to federal regulations, the Judiciary may not share the results of an individual's fingerprint report with that individual. 

H. Any questions or concerns regarding an item that appears on a fingerprint report or a CCH check shall be directed to Counsel to the Administrative Director at the Administrative Office of the Courts.

K Destruction of the Fingerprint Reports 

                        All copies and the original of the fingerprint reports must be destroyed immediately upon decision-making. 

                        Destruction of fingerprint reports shall be in the form of shredding.

                        The vicinage Human Resources Division Manager is responsible for ensuring that all such records are shredded. 

L  All proposed guardians who are subject to the policy will also be screened using the following Judiciary systems: (1) the Automated Traffic System (ATS), (2) Promis-Gavel, (3) the Judiciary's Children- in-Court (CIC) Documents Application, which will access limited areas of the Domestic Violence Central Registry through the Family Automated Case Tracking System (FACTS), Promis-Gavel, and the Automated Complaint System (ACS), and (4) the Civil Judgment and Order Docket (CJOD). No other internal Judiciary program may be 
New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy
for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised) (Corrected) 
Promulgated April 14, 2023 by Directive #06-23 Page 4 of 11 

searched. TheProbatePartjudgeorhis/herdesigneewillconductthis prior court history search. I f any adverse information is obtained by such search, the Probate Part judge or his/her designee will consult with the relevant Family/Criminal/Municipal Division Manager to ensure appropriate interpretation of the data. In addition, a certified judgment search may be conducted for proposed guardians in the discretion of the Probate Part judge based on factors including but not limited to the value of the guardianship estate, with costs to be paid by the proposed guardian. Results of these database searches may be confidentially shared with counsel for the alleged incapacitated person.

1. If the proposed guardian's name appears on one of these database searches, the information will be reviewed by the Probate Part judge for a determination as to whether the person should be precluded from appointment as guardian.

2. Records from the CIC Document Search must be destroyed immediately upon decision-making. Destruction of the records shall be in the form of shredding. The vicinage Human Resources Division Manager or designated staff is responsible for ensuring that all such records are shredded.

K. Evaluating Criminal History Background and Screening Information

1. The following factors may be considered in determining whether the criminal history background information and/or the screening information discovered through the search of Judiciary systems adversely relates to the proposed guardian's ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of guardianship in the best interests of the incapacitated person or estate:

      The nature and seriousness of the offense or misconduct; 

      The circumstances under which the offense or misconduct 
occurred; 

      The date of the offense or misconduct and the age of the 
proposed guardian when the offense or misconduct was committed; 

New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy
for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised) (Corrected)

Promulgated April 14, 2023 by Directive #06-23 Page 5 of 11

1 The disposition of the offense or misconduct; 

2 Whether the offense or misconduct was an isolated event; 

3 Evidence of rehabilitation; 

4 Whether the offense or misconduct is relevant to the 
responsibilities of a guardian; 

5 The vulnerability of the incapacitated person; and 

1. Whether appointing the proposed guardian diminishes the

public trust in the Judiciary.

2. All Probate Part judges and designees who review criminal history background and screening information need to be mindful of the presumption of innocence with respect to pending criminal charges. Review of pending criminal charges is a fact-sensitive exercise and will depend on the seriousness of the offense charged and the extent to which it touches upon the proposed guardian's prospective duties.

3. Review of data from criminal background checks and searches of Judiciary systems will be strictly limited to the Probate Part judge and/or his/her designee.

6 The decision to appoint or preclude appointment of a guardian based on criminal background check or screening data lies with the Probate Part judge. 

7 A proposed guardian whose appointment may be precluded based on the results of a criminal background check or screening must be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard on the record as to why the conviction or search result would not adversely affect the proposed guardian's ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of guardianship in the best interests of the incapacitated person or estate before the court decides to appoint or preclude appointment of the guardian. 

a. Proposed guardians who may be precluded from appointment based on data contained in a fingerprint report or screening data will be afforded an opportunity to

New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy
for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised) (Corrected)

Promulgated April 14, 2023 by Directive #06-23 Page 6 of 11

challenge any alleged inaccuracy or incompleteness of the informationwithinthereport. Proposedguardianswillbe provided with an appropriate "Notice of Rights" in such form as attached to this policy. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 16.30- 34, the "Notice of Rights (Fingerprinting)" sets forth the procedures that must be followed to challenge any alleged inaccuracies or incompleteness with a proposed guardian's fingerprint report. The proposed guardian shall be afforded a reasonable period of time to correct or complete any information contained in their fingerprint report.

b. A guardian background screening hearing shall be conducted in open court unless the underlying matter identified through the criminal background check or screening was a closed proceeding. The record of the guardian background screening hearing shall not be sealed unless the record of the underlying matter was sealed. However, the Probate Part judge retains discretion to seal the record of the guardian background screening hearing upon request for good cause shown.

L. At qualification and acceptance of the appointment of guardianship, the guardian's acceptance shall include an acknowledgment of compliance with this policy.

M. Guardians ordered to file periodic reports pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B: 12- 42 shall have an ongoing duty to comply with this policy by disclosing any changes to their criminal or civil judgment history in such reports.

New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy
for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised) (Corrected)

Promulgated April 14, 2023 by Directive #06-23 Page 7 of 11

New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy
for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults Acknowledgment Form

As part of the process of appointing a guardian of an incapacitated adult, the New Jersey Judiciary requires background checks for certain proposed guardians prior to qualification and acceptance of the appointment. The background check is one way that the court obtains information that is relevant to determining whether a person should be appointed as guardian. The process is designed to help the court in doing what is best for the person who is subject to the guardianship.

The Judiciary recognizes that good people make mistakes, or can be subject to unfortunate circumstances outside of their control. These facts will not disqualify them from being considered as a guardian. Rather, the court will take that information into consideration - along with information provided by the person who is offering to serve as guardian - and will make a decision based on all of the facts available, including the expressed preference of the alleged incapacitated person.

Proposed guardians must file a Certification of Criminal and Civil Judgment History with the complaint. The certification may be supplemented at any time up to the time of qualification and acceptance of appointment. If no proposed guardian has been identified when the complaint is filed, the certification must be filed no later than prior to the entry of judgment of legal incapacity and appointment of guardian. The proposed guardians will be fingerprinted and a criminal history check will be performed. These background checks access the National Crime Information Center's (NCIC) database of criminal arrests, criminal convictions, disorderly persons convictions, as well as any convictions that have been expunged.

The Judiciary also screens proposed guardians through a search of the following Judiciary systems: (1) the Automated Traffic System (ATS), (2) Promis-Gavel, (3) the Judiciary's Children-in-Court (CIC) Documents Application, which will access limited areas of the Domestic Violence Central Registry through the Family Automated Case Tracking System (FACTS), Promis-Gavel, and the Automated Complaint System (ACS), and (4) the Civil Judgment and Order Docket (CJOD). No other internal Judiciary program may be searched. In addition, the court may require that a certified judgment search be conducted for proposed guardians based on factors including but not limited to the value of the guardianship estate, with costs to be paid by the proposed guardian.

New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy
for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised) (Corrected)

Promulgated April 14, 2023 by Directive #06-23 Page 8 of 11

If a conviction is revealed, or if a proposed guardian's name appears on any of these database searches, the information will be reviewed for a determination as to whether the proposed guardian should be precluded from appointment as a guardian. Again, a conviction or an appearance in the search results will not automatically disqualify a proposed guardian from appointment. Rather, the court will consider whether the conviction or search result adversely affects the proposed guardian's ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of guardianship in the best interests of the incapacitated person or estate.

A proposed guardian whose appointment may be precluded based on criminal background check or screening data shall be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard on the record as to why the data would not adversely affect the proposed guardian's ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of guardianship in the best interests of the incapacitated person or estate before a decision on appointment is made. The proposed guardian will be given a "Notice of Rights," which sets forth procedures to challenge any alleged inaccuracies or incompleteness with a proposed guardian's fingerprint report, and an opportunity to challenge any alleged inaccuracy or incompleteness of the data. The proposed guardian shall also be afforded a reasonable period of time to correct or complete any information contained in their fingerprint report.

At qualification and acceptance of the appointment of guardianship, the guardian's acceptance shall include an acknowledgment of compliance with this policy.

Guardians ordered to file periodic reports pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B: 12-42 shall have an ongoing duty to comply with this policy by disclosing any changes to their criminal or civil judgment history in such reports.

New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy
for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised) (Corrected)

Promulgated April 14, 2023 by Directive #06-23 Page 9 of 11

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS REQUIRED TO PROCESS THE GUARDIANSHIP APPLICATION. YOU MUST COMPLETE AND SIGN THIS PAGE, AND RETURN IT WITHIN FIVE (5) BUSINESS DAYS TO:

COUNTY SURROGA TE COURT CITY, STATE ZIP

PLEASE KEEP A COPY OF THIS PAGE FOR YOUR RECORDS.

I acknowledge that I have received a copy of New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults.

I understand that the confidential personal identifiers that I provide below will be used only for the background screening, and not for any other purpose.

ADDRESS

County

Name of Proposed Guardian (Last, First, Middle)

Date of Birth

Street Address

Telephone Number

Signature

Docket Number

Alias, if any

Social Security Number

City, State ZIP

Email Address

Date

Records of guardianship proceedings are excluded from public access pursuant to N.J. Court Rule 1:38-3(e). Confidential personal identifiers may be submitted on this form pursuant to Rule l:38-7(b). This form shall be maintained as an administrative record excluded from public access pursuant to Rule 1:38-S(a).

New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy
for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised) (Corrected)

Promulgated April 14, 2023 by Directive #06-23 Page 10 of 11

Notice of Rights (Fingerprinting)

Please be advised that information in your background check may preclude you from being appointed as guardian of an incapacitated adult. You have the right to challenge this information and to present corrected or additional information to the court. Y our may obtain a copy of your identification record by submitting a written request via the U.S. mails directly to the F.B.I., Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, ATTN: SCU, Mod. D-2, 1000 Custer Hollow Road, Clarksburg, WV 26306. Such a request must be accompanied by satisfactory proof of identity. Your request must also be accompanied by the applicable fee in the form of a certified check or money order, payable to the Treasury of the United States.

If, after reviewing your identification record, you believe that it is incorrect or incomplete in any respect, you may make application directly to the agency that contributed the questioned information or direct your challenge to the F.B.I., Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, ATTN: SCU, Mod. D-2, 1000 Custer Hollow Road, Clarksburg, WV 26306. The F.B.I. will then forward the challenge to the agency which submitted the date requesting that agency to verify or correct the challenged entry.

Notice of Rights (Judiciary System Check)

Please be advised that information in your background check may preclude you from being appointed as guardian of an incapacitated adult. You have the right to challenge this information and to present corrected or additional information to the court. Pursuant to the current Background Screening Policy for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults, candidates are also screened using Judiciary computer systems. Please note that your presumptive preclusion was based upon information revealed after a check of these Judiciary computer systems.

New Jersey Judiciary Background Screening Policy
for Proposed Guardians of Incapacitated Adults (Revised) (Corrected)

Promulgated April 14, 2023 by Directive #06-23 Page 11 of 11

Attachment 2

Amendments to Rule 4:86-2, Effective May 1, 2023

 

4:86-2. Complaint; Accompanying Documents; Alternative Affidavits or Certifications

W ...no change

.Qu Accompanying Documents. The complaint shall have annexed thereto:

ill ill ill

...no change ...no change

An affidavit or certification setting forth the criminal and civil judgment history of each proposed guardian, in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. The affidavit or certification may be supplemented at any time up to the time of qualification and acceptance of appointment. If no proposed guardian has been identified at the time of the filing of the complaint, the affidavit or certification shall be filed no later than prior to the entry of the judgment of legal incapacity and appointment of guardian. The court will consider the relevant history as provided in the affidavit or certification and through any background screening policy for proposed guardians of incapacitated adults promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts, including but not limited to fingerprinting.

[Except as specifically ordered by the court pursuant to subparagraph (H), the] The following shall be exempt from this requirement:

2

® individuals who are the parents in a parent and child relationship with an alleged incapacitated person, as "parent and child relationship" is defined by the New Jersey Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9: 17-39, or who were appointed legal guardians of an alleged incapacitated person prior to their reaching majority pursuant to an order of the Family Division of Superior Court;

.Qll individuals who are married to an alleged incapacitated person in accordance with N.J.S.A. 37:1-29 et seq., in a civil union with an alleged incapacitated person as defined by N.J.S.A. 37: 1-29, or in a domestic partnership with an alleged incapacitated person as defined by N.J.S.A. 26:8A- 3;

© pendente lite temporary guardians appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:12-24.l(c);

agencies authorized to act pursuant to P.L.1985, c. 298 (N.J.S.A. [C.] 52:27G-20 et seq.), P.L.1985, c. 145 (N.J.S.A. [C.] 30:6D-23 et seq.), P.L.1965, c. 59 (N.J.S.A. [C.] 30:4-165.1 et seq.) and P.L.1970, c. 289 (N.J.S.A. [C.] 30:4-165.7 et seq.);

® public officials appointed as limited guardians of the person for medical purposes for individuals in psychiatric facilities listed in [R.S.] N.J.S.A. 30:1-7;

3

ill banks, trust companies, credit unions, savings and loan associations, or other financial institutions duly licensed or authorized to conduct business under applicable state or federal laws; and

ill} attorneys admitted to practice law and in good standing in the State of New Jersey who are appointed by the court in their professional capacity; and

.(fil notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) through (G), [the]
ill Any proposed guardian who is exempt from background

screening pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) shall file an affidavit or certification setting forth the proposed guardian's criminal and civil judgment history for the prior 10 years; and

(ii) The court may require any proposed guardian to file an affidavit or certification setting forth the proposed guardian's criminal and civil judgment history or to undergo background screening as a prerequisite to appointment based on the individual facts of the case, including but not limited to the value of the guardianship estate; and

ill A Case Information Statement in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. Said Case Information Statement shall include the date of birth and Social Security number of the alleged incapacitated person.

4

...no change.

Note: Source - R.R. 4: 102-2; former R. 4:83-2 amended and rule redesignated June 29, 1990 to be effective September 4, 1990; paragraphs (b) and (c) amended July 14, 1992 to be effective September 1, 199~; paragraph (b) amended July 13, 1994 to be effective September 1, 1994; paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) amended July 12, 2002 to be effective September 3, 2002; paragraphs (b) and (c) amended July 28, 2004 to be effective September 1, 2004; paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) amended July 9, 2008 to be effective September 1, 2008; caption amended, and paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) amended and captions added August 1, 2016 to be effective September 1, 2016; new subparagraph (b)(3) added and former subparagraph (b)(3) redesignated as (b)(4) March 15, 2021 to be effective May 15, 2021; paragraph (b)(3) revised April 5, 2023 to be effective May 1, 2023.

5

Attachment 3

Revised Form - Certification of Criminal and Civil Judgment History (CN 12706)

Filing Attorney Information or Pro Se Litigant:

Name - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NJ Attorney ID Number

Law Firm/Agency Name: Address

Email Address ------------- Telephone Number

In the Matter of

an Alleged Incapacitated Person

Superior Court of New Jersey
Chancery Division - Probate Part
County
Docket Number- - - - - - - - - -

Civil Action

Certification of Criminal and Civil Judgment History

I, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , date of birth _ _ _ _ _, hereby certify as follows:

This certification is made by me in support of an application for a declaration of incapacity and appointmentofguardianfor_______________ ("the alleged incapacitated person"). I am seeking appointment by the court as guardian for the alleged incapacitated person. (Select either A or Band complete that section.)

D A.

I AM the alleged incapacitated person's parent, legal guardian (appointed by a Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part order before the alleged incapacitated person turned eighteen (18) years of age), or spouse, civil union or domestic partner.

D In the last ten (10) years, I have not been convicted of a crime other than a traffic violation, and no civil judgments (including bankruptcy) have been entered against me. (Under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-27, expunged criminal records are deemed not to have occurred and shall not be disclosed.)

OR

D In the last ten (10) years, I have been convicted of a crime other than a traffic violation, and/or have criminal charges pending against me, and/or a civil judgment (including bankruptcy) has been entered against me, as listed below (use extra pages if needed).

1. 2. 3.

Charge/Conviction/Civil Judgment Date

Location

Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #06-23 (04/14/2023), CN 12706

page 1 of 2

B.

I AM NOT the alleged incapacitated person's parent, legal guardian (appointed by a Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part order before the alleged incapacitated person turned eighteen (18) years of age), or spouse, civil union or domestic partner.

D I have never been convicted of a crime other than a traffic violation, and no civil judgments (including bankruptcy) have ever been entered against me. (Under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-27, expunged criminal records are deemed not to have occurred and shall not be disclosed.)

OR

D A t any time in the past, I have been convicted o f a crime other than a traffic violation, and/or have criminal charges pending against me, and/or a civil judgment (including bankruptcy) has been entered against me, as listed below (use extra pages if needed).

Charge/Conviction/Civil Judgment Date Location

1. 2. 3.

I understand that a criminal charge/conviction or civil judgment will not automatically disqualify me from appointment as guardian of the alleged incapacitated person. Rather, the court will consider whether the charge/conviction or judgment adversely affects my ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of guardianship in the best interests of the incapacitated person or estate.

The history listed above does not adversely affect my ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of guardianship in the best interests of the incapacitated person or estate because (use extra pages if needed):

I hereby certify and say that the foregoing statements made by me are true to the best of my knowledge, and that I will supplement this form as may be necessary should additional information become available. I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.

Date Signature

Print Name

Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #06-23 (04/14/2023), CN 12706 page 2 of 2

Attachment 4

Revised Form - Order Fixing Guardianship Hearing Date and Appointing Attorney for Alleged Incapacitated Person (CN 12013)

Filing Attorney Information or Pro Se Litigant:

Name - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NJ Attorney ID Number

Law Firm/Agency Name: Address

Email Address ------------- Telephone Number

In the Matter of,

an Alleged Incapacitated Person

Superior Court of New Jersey
Chancery Division - Probate Part
County
Docket Number- - - - - - - - - -

Civil Action

Order Fixing Guardianship Hearing Date and Appointing Attorney for Alleged Incapacitated Person

THIS MATTER having been opened to the court by
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , plaintiff(s), for a judgment declaring
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , an incapacitated person and appointing a guardian of the person and/or estate (property) pursuant to applicable New Jersey statutes and Rules of Court, and for such other relief as the court may deem just, and the court having read and considered the verified complaint, the supporting certifications or affidavits, and all other papers and pleadings filed in this matter, and for good cause shown:

IT IS on t h i s _ day o f _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2 0 _ , ORDERED that:

3 This matter be set down for hearing before this court at the _ _ _ _ _ _ County Courthouse,_____________ ,NewJerseyonthe
_ _ day of_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ 20_, at _ _ _ D am/D pm or as soon thereafter as plaintiff may be heard, to determine the issues of incapacity of_______________ andtheappointmentofaguardian. 

4 A copy of the verified complaint, supporting affidavits or certifications and this Order, shall be served on the alleged incapacitated person, by personally serving the same at least
20 days prior to the date scheduled for the hearing. 

5 A separate notice shall be personally served on the alleged incapacitated person stating that if they desire to oppose the action, they may appear either in person or by attorney and may demand a trial by jury. 

Revised Fonn Promulgated by Directive #06-2023 (04/14/2023), CN 12013 page I of 3

      A copy of the verified complaint, supporting affidavits or certifications and this Order shall also be served on all the next-of-kin and other parties-in-interest identified in the verified complaint by certified mail, return receipt requested at least 20 days prior to the date scheduled for the hearing. If applicable, a copy of the verified complaint, supporting affidavits or certifications and this Order shall be served on the County Adjuster and the Regional Administrator for the Division of Developmental Disabilities. 

      ______________,,Esquire,whoseofficeaddressis: telephone number _ _ _ _ _ _ ext. _ _ _ , is hereby appointed as attorney for the alleged incapacitated person. The appointed attorney shall personally interview the alleged incapacitated person, examine the medical records, make inquiry of persons having knowledge of the alleged incapacitated person's circumstances, their physical and mental state and their property, make reasonable inquiries to locate any Will or other testamentary substitutes, powers of attorney or health care directives previously executed by the alleged incapacitated person, or to discover any interests the alleged incapacitated person may have as a beneficiary of a will or trust. The appointed attorney shall prepare a written report of findings and recommendations (and, if applicable, an affidavit of services) to be filed with the Court and with the plaintiff(s) and other parties who have filed a written response at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing. Select one: D The attorney appointed to represent the alleged incapacitated person is appointed pro bona (without cost). OR D The attorney appointed to represent the alleged incapacitated person is to be paid. Pursuant to R. 4:86-4(d), the court may direct that the appointed attorney be paid from the assets of the alleged incapacitated person, or if such assets are insufficient, then from the party seeking guardianship or otherwise. 

      If the alleged incapacitated person obtains an attorney other than the attorney appointed by the above paragraph, that attorney shall notify the court and the appointed attorney at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing date. 

      A copy of the verified complaint, supporting affidavits or certifications and this Order shall be immediately served on the attorney for the alleged incapacitated person by personal service, certified mail, return receipt requested. I f acceptable to the court-appointed attorney, service may be via facsimile, by regular mail, and/or by email. 

      The attorney above appointed to represent the alleged incapacitated person is hereby regarded as a HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) representative for the alleged incapacitated person and shall have the right and power to examine complete medical records, including medical and psychiatric records and written charts, pertaining to the alleged incapacitated person, and to visit and confer with the alleged incapacitated 

Revised Form Promulgated by Directive #06-2023 (04/14/2023), CN 12013 page 2 of 3

 

 

Tuesday, May 9, 2023

No settlement unless parties accept an offer In the Matter of the Admin. of the Estate of McLaughlin

No settlement unless parties accept an offer  In the Matter of the Admin. of the Estate of McLaughlin Sister appealed order upholding a disputed settlement agreement between her and her sister and two nieces over decedent brother's estate. After months of negotiations, parties told Chancery judge they had settled but never sent a stipulation to judge who directed nieces to file a motion to enforce a settlement. Chancery judge interpreted emails between parties and attorneys to mean there "was nothing left open" and an agreement was reached. Court disagreed that the email exchange showed sister's agent gave final consent to the settlement draft.

      Court found drafts of the settlement proposal circulated in 2018 and 2019 and did not initially include mutual releases. The email accompanying the last version of the agreement read "please find the latest draft of the settlement agreement for your review." That email constituted an offer, not unequivocal acceptance of any proposal. Furthermore, sister's attorney never responded to the last draft and if that email was a final counteroffer, it was never accepted and expired due to the time elapsed before any action was taken on it. Court found no settlement was reached. source https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1631907793NJA271819/


NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN J. McLAUGHLIN, deceased.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2718-19

page1image1373266016

Argued September 7, 2021 – Decided September 17, 2021

Before Judges Alvarez and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Somerset County, Docket No. 12- 000298.

PER CURIAM

Rita Loughlin appeals a February 5, 2020 order upholding a disputed settlement agreement between she and her sister Mary Lynch (the sisters),and two nieces, Licia McLaughlin-Zegar and Jamie McLaughlin Ubaldi (the nieces), beneficiaries of the estate of John J. McLaughlin. Decedent was the brother and uncle of the parties and died intestate on January 31, 2012. The parties have since litigated the administration of his estate. A court-appointed administrator also joined in the nieces' application to enforce the proposed settlement. We now reverse and remand, concluding that the parties did not reach the necessary meeting of the minds.

The Chancery judge's oral decision, placed on the record after argument, first reviews the case's protracted history and "months and months of negotiations among counsel." The parties informed the judge several times that they had settled, but never sent her a stipulation, thus she directed the nieces to file a motion "to enforce a settlement." The judge next discussed various emails between counsel exchanging the written proposed agreement, as well as the agreement itself. Reading the language of the emails through the prism of agency law, she noted that Loughlin's attorney told his adversary and the

Lynch does not appear to be involved in this appeal, and it is unclear from the record if she takes a position with regard to the settlement in dispute.

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administrator "I'll get back to you" after receiving a final draft of the agreement that included contested mutual releases between the sisters and the nieces.

The judge interpreted that final email to mean that "[t]here was nothing left open." The judge further concluded that since counsel was acting with apparent authority on Loughlin's behalf, "it is unequivocal that a settlement was reached and the mere fact that [Loughlin] changed her mind is of no moment. Her representative, her agent said it was done and it's done. This is four years into this litigation."2

On appeal, Loughlin challenges the enforcement order for these reasons: POINT I

SINCE A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS NEVER FINALIZED, THE COURT CANNOT ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT[.]

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENFORCING A SETTLEMENT THAT GAVE THE PARTIES A BETTER AGREEMENT THAN THEY NEGOTIATED[.]

We address only Loughlin's first point, as we do not find that the email exchange supports the judge's finding that Loughlin's agent gave final consent

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2
exchange of emails and Loughlin's defense of the motion to enforce a settlement.

The judge deemed irrelevant the substitution of counsel between the last

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on his client's behalf to the settlement draft. Accordingly, we do not reach the second point.

"[A]n attorney is presumed to possess authority to act on behalf of the client . . . ." Jennings v. Reed, 381 N.J. Super. 217, 231 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Sur. Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Williams, 729 F.2d 581, 582 (8th Cir. 1984)). However, settlements are governed by contract law and require assent to the essential terms to be valid. Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 447 N.J. Super. 423, 438-39 (App. Div. 2016). Assent is evidenced by an offer of sufficiently definite terms and acceptance of those terms. GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Willoughby, 230 N.J. 172, 185 (2017) (quoting Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992)). "'In the very nature of the contract, acceptance must be absolute' and 'unequivocally shown.'" Cumberland Farms, 447 N.J. Super. at 439 (quoting Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co., 11 N.J. 526, 538 (1953)). Once a settlement offer is made, the offeree holds the power of acceptance until the offer is terminated. Berberian v. Lynn, 355 N.J. Super. 210, 217 (App. Div. 2002).

Because settlement agreements are subject to contract law principles, we review a trial judge's interpretation and construction de novo. In Re Estate of Balk, 445 N.J. Super. 395, 400 (App. Div. 2016) (citing Kieffer v. Best Buy,

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205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011)). As always, a trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal conclusions that flow therefrom are not entitled to particular deference. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

Our earlier unpublished opinion regarding this estate remanded for the court to include a particular significant account as a probate asset. See In re Estate of McLaughlin, No. A-0441-16 (App. Div. Feb. 16, 2018) (slip op. at 2). This in the context of the nieces having failed to notify the sisters regarding his funeral arrangements or the appointment of an estate administrator. Ibid. The court-appointed administrator had taken the position that the disputed funds were a non-probate asset that passed directly to the nieces despite decedent's failure to specifically designate them on the account as the beneficiaries. Id. at 5. That is the backdrop within which we consider the various emailsthe long- standing disputes between the parties.

Turning to the events occurring after the February 16, 2018 remand, drafts of a settlement proposal circulated late in 2018 into 2019, which did not initially include mutual releases. When the matter was scheduled by the court in compliance with the remand, Loughlin's attorney requested a postponement so the parties could continue working on the settlement.

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The nieces' attorney eventually informed the administrator and the sisters' attorney that mutual release language was missing from the draft agreement. Loughlin's attorney responded on February 25, 2019, that the administrator "wrote those releases into her revision," to which the nieces' attorney responded the next day, "I will discuss with [the administrator] so we can get this finalized."

On April 2, 2019, Loughlin's attorney then said, "I think [we have] addressed all of your concerns in the draft that last circulated. Is there anything else[,] or is this ready to go?" The judge found this indicated acceptance of the release provision. However, when the nieces' attorney's office forwarded the last version of the agreement on April 10, 2019, the accompanying email read "[a]ttached hereto please find the latest draft of the settlement agreement for your review."

These emails, to which the documents were attached, constituted offers and counteroffers, not unequivocal acceptance of anyone's proposal. They could not effectively form a contract. See State v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 386 N.J. Super. 600, 612 (App. Div. 2006). From the series of exchanges, it does not appear there was ever more than counteroffers, requiring additional reviews and consents by each party. See Berberian v. Lynn, 355 N.J. Super. 210, 217 (App.

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Div. 2002). Curiously, Loughlin's attorney never responded to the last draft he received. The record reveals no further communication between the parties from April 10, 2019, until the enforcement application was filed by the nieces in January 2020 at the direction of the court.This delay is also inexplicable.

Even if the document forwarded by the nieces' attorney's office is characterized as a final counteroffer, as it included the releases which the administrator had initially added, that counteroffer would have expired given the substantial amount of time that elapsed before any action was taken on it. See Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 386 N.J. Super. at 612. There are questions of fact left open by the email chain. The issue should not have been decided without further proceedings and an adequately developed record.

If the April email is viewed as conveying a counteroffer, the power of acceptance was Loughlin's, who never exercised it. See Berberian, 355 N.J. Super. at 217. Thus, there was no enforceable settlement. Loughlin's attorney's April 10, 2019 email merely thanks counsel for providing another revision, stating that he would "get back to" the nieces' attorney. It is simply not a basis for a finding that a meeting of the minds had been reached and an enforceable

At oral argument on appeal, the nieces' counsel represented that Loughlin's attorney was not responding to phone calls.

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agreement created. In light of the acrimonious ongoing litigation and the relatively modest size of the estate, we can understand everyone's motivation to end the matter. But no settlement was reached. We vacate the judge's order and remand the matter for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

Reversed and remanded.

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Monday, May 8, 2023

Probate court could impose surcharge on executor even after release signed In the Matter of the Estate of Hauke

 

Probate court could impose surcharge on executor even after release signed   In the Matter of the Estate of Hauke

The co-executors of the estates of Rudolph and Helen Hauke appealed from the trial court's judgment ruling that a release did not bar the imposition of surcharges on the co-executors. In a prior decision, the court affirmed a chancery division judgment that approved formal accounting for the estates. The judgment imposed substantial surcharges on the co-executors. However, the court remanded for the chancery division to determine if a mutual release signed by the co-executors and their brother in a settlement of a prior chancery division litigation precluded the imposition of the surcharges. On remand, the chancery court ruled that the release did not bar the surcharges, or alternatively, that the co-executors had waived their claim to rely on the release to preclude the imposition of surcharges. On appeal, the court affirmed the chancery court's ruling. Although the release precluded the co-executors' brother from seeking reimbursement of his attorneys' fees, the court noted that the chancery court's underlying judgment did not award the co-executors' brother any legal fees. Instead, the court found that the surcharge merely directed the co-executors to pay the legal fees of another party. Finally, the court rejected co-executors' brother's contention that the chancery division failed to consider the imposition of sanctions for co-executors' delay in raising the issue of their release, noting that co-executors' brother made no request for sanctions to the chancery court.

Source https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1643660166NJA452819/

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4528-19 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF RUDOLPH HAUKE, deceased, AND OF THE RUDOLPH HAUKE FAMILY REMAINDER TRUST AND MARITAL TRUST, 

and 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF HELEN HAUKE, deceased, AND OF THE
RUDOLPH HAUKE FAMILY REMAINDER TRUST AND MARITAL TRUST. ______________________________ 

Argued January 18, 2022 – Decided January 31, 2022 

Before Judges Fasciale and Vernoia. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Monmouth County, Docket Nos. P-000323-16 and P-000324-16. 

PER CURIAM
This probate matter returns before us for a second time. In our prior 

decision we affirmed a May 23, 2018 Chancery Division final judgment approving formal accountings for the estates and trusts of decedents Rudolph B. Hauke and Helen P. Hauke. In the Matter of the Estate of Rudolph Hauke, No. A-5200-17 (App. Div. Mar. 25, 2020) (slip op. at 18). The judgment imposed substantial surcharges on Gregory Hauke (Gregory) and Thomas Hauke (Thomas), the estates' former co-executors (the co-executors).Id. at 2. We remanded for the court to determine whether, under the circumstances presented, a mutual release executed by Gregory, Thomas, and their brother Paul Hauke (Paul) in connection with their settlement of a prior Chancery Division litigation barred the court's imposition of the surcharges. The co-executors appeal from the remand court's order determining the release did not bar imposition of the surcharges, and, even if it did, the co-executors' waived their right to rely on the 

Because they share a surname, we refer to the decedents' children by their first names for clarity and to avoid confusion. We intend no disrespect in doing so. 

A-4528-19 

release as a bar to the imposition of the surcharges. Unpersuaded by the co- executors' arguments, we affirm. 

I.
The pertinent facts are well-known to the parties, are summarized in our 

prior opinion, id. at 2-4, and need not be repeated at length. We provide only those facts pertinent to our discussion of the issues presented. 

Following the deaths of their parents in 2011 and 2012, Gregory and Thomas initially served as co-executors of their parents' estates, but they were removed as co-executors by court order in 2014, id. at 2-3, and replaced by administrator John G. Hoyle, III (Hoyle). The co-executors filed a Chancery Division action against Paul involving "non-probate assets and change of beneficiary claims."Id. at 3. The co-executors averred that Paul exerted undue influence over Helen Hauke resulting in the wrongful transfer of monies to him and changes of her beneficiary designations on certain life insurance policies. 

On the second day of trial in that matter, the parties reached a settlement. They agreed to a Consent Judgment and Stipulation of Settlement (the consent 

 

A fourth brother, Richard Hauke (Richard), was also a plaintiff in the Chancery Division action filed against Paul. Richard is not a participant in this appeal. 

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judgement), which was entered by the court. Ibid. They also executed a document titled "Mutual General Releases" (the release). 

In pertinent part, the consent order required that Hoyle file his final accountings and proposed distribution schedule with the Monmouth County Surrogate's Office for the estates and trusts of Rudolph and Helen Hauke. As part of the consent order, the co-executors and Paul "STIPULATED AND AGREED . . . the parties shall be permitted to file exceptions to the accountings pursuant to the New Jersey Court Rules and the parties further agree[d] they will not appeal the [c]ourt's ruling on the accountings and exceptions." 

The release provided that Paul released the co-executors from any and all claims he might have against them, including "those of which [he] is not aware and those not specifically mentioned in [the] release."The release also covered any claim Paul could have asserted against the co-executors in the settled litigation or "as [the claim] relates to the subject of the Estate of Helen Hauke or the Estate of Rudolph Hauke or [their] respective trusts." The release further included a covenant not to sue. 

The release included an identical release of claims from the co-executors to Paul. The co-executors' release of claims against Paul was not an issue before the Chancery Division and is not an issue on appeal. 

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The release of claims is not without limitation. It provides that "[t]he parties retain the right to file exceptions to the Estate/Trust accountings pursuant to [the] New Jersey Court Rules and as provided in the" consent judgment. 

In the release, the "parties agree[d] . . . they will not seek anything further from each other, including attorney's fees, costs or any other payments." However, the release includes an express and plainly stated exception to that covenant. In the release, the parties agree not to seek anything further from each other "except as permitted in [the consent judgment]." And, as noted, in the consent judgment the parties stipulated and agreed "the parties shall be permitted to file exceptions to the accountings pursuant to the New Jersey Court Rules." 

As we explained in our prior opinion, Hoyle filed two separate formal accountings for the estates. Id. at 4. Paul filed exceptions to the accountings, and the co-executors filed a response to the exceptions. Id. at 4. 

The court conducted a hearing over five days to address Hoyle's final accountings and Paul's exceptions. Ibid. During the hearing, the co-executors did not introduce the release in evidence. They instead waited until closing arguments, and then asserted for the first time that the release barred any relief based on Paul's exceptions. Paul's counsel objected to the argument, noting it 

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was not supported by any record evidence. The court sustained the objection, rejecting the co-executors' efforts to rely on a release that was not in evidence and was referenced for the first time during their counsel's summation. 

In its final decision on the accountings, the court made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each of Paul's exceptions, accepting some and rejecting others. As a result of its acceptance of the exceptions, the court ordered surcharges against the co-executors. 

The court entered the May 23, 2018 final judgment, which in pertinent part ordered Gregory to pay a $157,533.47 surcharge and Thomas to pay a $160,817.86 surcharge. The final judgment included a "JUDGMENT WORKSHEET," which listed, by numerical designation, each of the exceptions filed to the various schedules in Hoyle's accountings. The worksheet also identified which exceptions had been withdrawn by Paul. For the exceptions that were not withdrawn, the court separately listed the amount, if any, of the surcharges awarded against the co-executors based on the court's detailed findings in its bench opinion.

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The court ordered the imposition of a single surcharge in the amount of $333.75 against Richard. One surcharge, in the amount of $2,831.91, was imposed on Gregory only. All the remaining surcharges ordered by the court were imposed against the co-executors. 

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The court's final judgment on the accountings awarded Hoyle $41,748.09 in attorney's fees from the estates and trusts. The judgment also made provision for a future attorney's fee award to Hoyle based on the continuation of his duties as a fiduciary. 

In addition, the court further awarded the estate a surcharge for attorney's fees incurred by Hoyle during his administration of the estates and trusts. As reflected in the worksheet attached to the final judgment, the court imposed the surcharge against the co-executors for an amount "to be awarded upon submission of [a] fee application."In the court's final decision on the accountings, it explained that it imposed the surcharge for attorney's fees incurred by Hoyle because the "fees would not have been incurred by the estate but for the deliberate failures of [the co-executors] and the dereliction of their fiduciary duties." The court noted there was "no set amount" of the fees in the accountings, but the court "award[ed] that surcharge against [the co-executors]," and determined "the fees incurred by . . . Hoyle are to be surcharged against [the co-executors]." Pertinent to this appeal, neither the court's final judgment, nor 

In its decision from the bench and the worksheet annexed to its final judgment, the court referred to exception number "61" as the basis for the surcharge imposed for the attorney's fees incurred by Hoyle. 

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any part of its determination of the exceptions filed by Paul, reflects an award of attorney's fees in Paul's favor against the co-executors. 

On the co-executors' appeal from the final judgment, we affirmed the court's decision on the merits. That is, we rejected the co-executors' challenges to the court's final judgement approving the final judgment and determining the exceptions and the amounts of the surcharges. In fact, we affirmed the court's findings and legal conclusions on the accountings and the exceptions, "substantially for the reasons expressed by the judge." Id. at 2. 

We remanded the matter for limited issues unrelated to the court's determinations concerning the exceptions and approval of the accountings. We noted the "co-executors mainly contend[ed] that the [r]elease should have barred any surcharges against them," id. at 7, and we remanded for the trial court to consider whether the release barred Paul's filing of the exceptions that resulted in the surcharges, as well as Paul's argument the court correctly determined the co-executors waived their right to rely on the release. Id. at 10. We also noted "the co-executors let approximately twenty-three months elapse before their counsel brought the [r]elease to the [court's] attention." Id. at 9. And we explained "[t]he parties completely prepared themselves for trial," and the co- executors waited until closing argument to raise the release as an issue, and 

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"[e]ven then . . . did not provide the actual [r]elease agreement to the [court]." Ibid. 

We also explained the parties made various arguments concerning whether the co-executors' delay in raising the release resulted in a waiver of their right to rely on it, and whether the release barred reliance on Paul's exceptions in imposing the surcharges. Id. at 10. We then found that based on the record presented, "we [were] unable to resolve all arguments as to the release," and we remanded "on [that] issue, and if appropriate, the determination whether sanctions for the co-executors delay in raising the issue are appropriate." Ibid. 

On remand, the court accepted written submissions from the parties, heard argument, and, in a detailed and thorough opinion from the bench, determined the release did not bar Paul's filing of exceptions or the resultant surcharges imposed on the co-executors. The court also determined that even if the release otherwise barred the imposition of the surcharges, the release did not impact the court's final judgment approving the final accountings and surcharges because the co-executors waived their right to rely on the release by not raising it as a defense to the exceptions to the final accountings until their closing argument. The court entered an order finding the release "has no impact" on the final 

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judgment approving the final accountings and imposing the surcharges against the co-executors. 

II.
In their appeal from the court's order, the co-executors do not challenge 

the court's determination the release did not bar, and therefore did not have any impact on, Paul's filing of exceptions to the final accountings, the surcharges imposed, and the court's final judgment. At oral argument, the co-executors conceded the court correctly determined the release did not bar Paul's filing of the exceptions and the imposition of the surcharges as set forth in the final judgment and as reflected on the worksheet annexed to the judgment. 

The co-executors' concession is not surprising. Based on our review of the record, there are no grounds supporting a reversal of the court's order, and we affirm it substantially for the reasons explained in the court's thorough and thoughtful opinion. To the extent the co-executors' brief on appeal argues the court erred in finding the release did not bar Paul's filing of exceptions or the imposition of the surcharges, it is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

As their counsel explained during oral argument, the co-executors' claim on appeal is limited to the contention that the release barred an order directing 

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that they pay Paul's attorney's fees. The same argument was made in the co- executors' brief on appeal. They contend the release did not permit Paul to make a claim against them for attorney's fees. They claim the final judgment ordered they pay Paul's attorney's fees, and they argue that directive violates the terms of the release. The co-executor's contend the remand court erred by not addressing whether the release barred Paul's claim for, and receipt of a judgment against them for, his attorney's fees. 

The co-executors present an argument in search of a factual basis. The final judgment does not include an attorney's fee award in Paul's favor against the co-executors. In the co-executors' brief on appeal, they make frequent reference to a purported attorney's fee award in Paul's favor, but they do not cite to an order directing such an award. See R. 2:6-2(a)(5) (requiring an appellant's brief to include "[a] concise statement of the facts material to the issues on appeal supported by references to the appendix and transcript"); see also Walters v. YMCA, 437 N.J. Super. 111, 120-21 (App. Div. 2014). 

When asked during oral argument for a citation to the record for the purported attorney's fee award, co-executors' counsel could not provide one. Additionally, our independent review of the record does not reveal an order directing that co-executors pay Paul's attorney's fees. Indeed, in our decision on 

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their initial appeal, we summarized the co-executors' arguments challenging the court's approval of the final accountings, and the co-executors did not claim any error related to a purported award of attorney's fees to Paul.

When asked during oral argument if there was any order for attorney's fees included with the court's final judgment, Paul's counsel pointed only to the final judgment's order awarding attorney's fees to Hoyle from the estate, and the surcharge the court imposed under the exception designated on the worksheet as "61." As we have explained, the court imposed that surcharge against the co- executors for attorney's fees due to Hoyle. Thus, it could not be properly construed as an attorney's fee award to Paul. However, even if it could, the co- executors conceded the release did not bar Paul from filling exceptions to the accountings, and the co-executors further conceded they do not challenge the validity of any of the imposed surcharges. 

The co-executors' notice of appeal in their initial appeal refers only to the May 23, 2018 final judgment, and their notice of appeal in this matter refers only to the remand court's August 13, 2020 order finding the release had no impact on the final judgment. Neither order includes an award of attorney's fees in Paul's favor against the co-executors. Thus, to the extent there exists a separate order awarding attorney's fees in Paul's favor against the co-executors, we may not properly review it. See Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 298-99 (2020) (explaining an appellate court "review[s] 'only the judgment or orders designated in the notice of appeal" (quoting 1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 456, 459 (App. Div. 2004))). 

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In sum, we discern no basis to reverse the remand court's order based on its alleged failure to consider if the release barred an award of attorney's fees to Paul. The co-executors failed to demonstrate any such order was entered, and the court did not err by failing to consider an issue lacking any support in the record. We therefore affirm the remand court's order. 

For purposes of completeness, we note the co-executors also argue the remand court erred by finding they waived the right to rely on release because they raised the issue of the release—which was never admitted in evidence during the trial on the final accountings—for the first time in their closing arguments at trial. They contend that in our initial decision we reversed the trial court's decision sustaining Paul's objection to the co-executors' closing arguments based on the release, and that our remand therefore did not permit the court to address the waiver issue. 

We disagree with the co-executors' interpretation of our remand order. As the court correctly recognized, our remand permitted consideration of both the waiver issue and whether the release barred Paul's filing of exceptions to the accountings and the resultant surcharges. In our prior decision, we noted the parties made various arguments—including whether the delay in raising the release resulted in a waiver and whether the release barred the filing of the 

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exceptions—and we found we were unable to resolve the arguments presented related to the release. We then remanded for the court to address "that issue," which included the parties' arguments concerning waiver. Thus, the remand court properly considered the waiver issue, and we affirm the court's determination the co-executors waived their right to rely on the settlement agreement during their closing argument for the reasons set forth in the court's opinion. The co-executors' arguments to the contrary are without sufficient merit to warrant any further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

We last address an issue raised during oral argument. Counsel for Paul asserted that pending before the trial court is a motion for the attorney's fees awarded to Hoyle as a surcharge against the co-executors in the final judgment under exception "61." Paul further asserts the remand court erred by failing to address the issue of sanctions as permitted in our remand order. Counsel argued the final judgment from which the initial appeal was taken, and the remand court's order, are therefore not final orders under R. 2:2-3(a)(1), and the matter should be remanded to the trial court to address those issues. 

With regard to the remand court's alleged failure to address the issue of sanctions, Paul did not make an application for sanctions to the remand court. And we did not order the court to impose sanctions; our remand permitted the 

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court to address the issue and determine if sanctions were appropriate based on the co-executors' delay in raising the release issue at the trial on the final accountings. Estate of Rudolph Hauke, slip op. at 10. The court was not required to impose sanctions for which no request was made, and we therefore construe the remand order as final because no application for sanctions was presented. We also note Paul never sought a remand to the court to allow for the filing of a motion for sanctions, never moved to dismiss this appeal as interlocutory, and did not cross-appeal from the court's order based on a claim the court erred by failing to address the sanctions issue. 

We are also not convinced any alleged issues related to the filing of a motion for Hoyle's attorney's fees pursuant to the surcharge imposed under exception "61" render the current appeal interlocutory. We reject the argument because the record is bereft of any evidence there are any open issues before the trial court concerning the final accountings, including issues related to the payment of Hoyle's attorney's fees as permitted by the trial court's ruling on exception "61." 

We have noted that "if an appeal is improvidently filed before resolution of [an attorney's fees issue], the party seeking fees should move before this court for a limited remand, or for dismissal of the appeal as interlocutory." N.J. Mfrs. 

page15image1445547024

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Ins. Co. v. Prestige Health Grp., LLC 

, 406 N.J. Super. 354, 358 (App. Div. 

2009). A failure to do so, results in that party losing their right to a review of 

300, 304 (App. Div. 2005) (explaining that where a party perceives an order to be interlocutory and that party fails to "move for either for dismissal of the appeal or, in the alternative, for a temporary remand to the Law Division, pursuant to Rule 2:9-1(a), to have the undecided issues resolved" that party loses "its right to our review of its post appellate judgment motion" (citation omitted)). 

We approved the final accountings in our initial decision, and there is no evidence Paul asserted the initial appeal was from an interlocutory order or moved to dismiss that appeal as interlocutory. Neither Paul nor the co-executors appealed from our initial decision. Our affirmance of the court's judgment approving the accountings is final, and, in our view, it is simply too late for Paul to argue our prior affirmance of the final accountings should be subject to a remand because there is an open issue as to the attorney's fees due Hoyle pursuant to the surcharge imposed under exception "61." Any such issues should have been raised in the prior appeal and will not be considered for the first time long after our decision affirming the court's final judgment. 

the outstanding issue. See 

Shimm v. Toys from the Attic, Inc., 375 N.J. Super. 

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Our remand order does not require a different result. The remand was for the singular purpose of determining whether the release should be applied to bar the challenged surcharges. The remand was not for the purpose of revisiting the court's determination of the exceptions and amount of the surcharges. Paul's belated assertion there is an open issue related to the amount of a surcharge should have been asserted in the initial appeal, in a motion to dismiss the initial appeal as interlocutory, or in an appeal from our initial decision. Our initial decision affirming the accountings renders moot any purported issues related to the merits of the accountings and the amount of any surcharges. Thus, there cannot be any open issues in the trial court related to the amount of a surcharge because all the issues related to the surcharges that were properly presented, or that could have been properly presented, were encompassed by our initial decision. 

Affirmed. 

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