Reasonableness of funeral expense also reviewed
OLD BRIDGE FUNERAL HOME, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KENNETH PRUCKOWSKI, ANTHONY
CASTIGLIONE, Individually and
as Executor of the Estate of
MARIE CONCETTA PRUCKOWSKI,
THERESA MARY DONNELLY and THE
ESTATE OF MARIE CONCETTA
PRUCKOWSKI,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
PAUL PRUCKOWSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
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Argued October 6, 2016 – Decided
Before Judges Messano and Suter.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-10927-14.
PER CURIAM
Paul Pruckowski
(Pruckowski) appeals an order denying his motion to file a cross-claim for
indemnification against the Estate of Marie Concetta Pruckowski (Estate) and
Anthony Castiglione, individually and as Executor of the Estate (Castiglione or
Executor), for the costs of his mother's funeral.
When Marie Pruckowski (decedent) passed away in
October 2014, she was survived by her children, Paul Pruckowski, Kenneth
Pruckowski and Theresa Mary Donnelly, (the children) and her brother, Anthony
Castiglione. Her estate was modest,
consisting of a house located in Old Bridge, subject to a reverse mortgage, and
a car. She did not have life insurance.
In March 2011,
decedent executed a Last Will and Testament (Will) in which she directed that
all her "just debts and funeral expenses" were to be fully paid and
satisfied. The Will expressly made
"no provision" for her three children. Rather, she devised her automobile to her
nephew, and directed that the proceeds from the sale of her home and its
contents "be given, devised and bequeathed" to St. Jude Children's
Hospital along with "the rest, residue and remainder of [her] estate."
Her brother was designated as the executor.
She did not name a funeral agent to address
her funeral arrangements. See N.J.S.A.
45:27-22(a).
Two weeks before
the decedent's death, Castiglione obtained a $13,000 price quote for her
funeral from his nephew, who was funeral director at a funeral home in Union. The price quote included a family discount. The Union funeral home agreed to accept
payment after the Estate was settled.
The children
wanted a funeral closer to Old Bridge, where the decedent's family and friends
lived. Pruckowski claimed that
Castiglione told him to plan the funeral, without imposing any financial restrictions.
After obtaining two similar price quotes
from nearby funeral homes, Pruckowski "booked" the funeral with Old
Bridge Funeral Home (Funeral Home) for $30,789. He signed a "Payment Policy" that
required full payment before the funeral services.
By the morning of
the funeral, only a small deposit had been paid. When the Executor would not pay the remainder and
the Funeral Home insisted on payment to proceed with the funeral, the children each
signed a "Contract/Promissory Note," agreeing to pay the balance
remaining of $26,374. The contract
provided that payment was a personal obligation "in addition to the
liability imposed by law upon the estate and others."
The Funeral Home
filed suit for breach of contract and other causes of action when the
outstanding balance was not paid, naming as defendants the children, Castiglione
(as Executor and in his individual capacity) and the Estate. In their answer, counterclaim and cross-claim,
Castiglione and the Estate denied financial responsibility for the funeral because
the children had made the funeral arrangements, although the Estate was willing
to pay for reasonable funeral expenses. Pruckowski filed an answer, which requested an
accounting because, he contended, there should have been available estate funds
for the funeral from the decedent's reverse mortgage. The other children were defaulted when they did
not answer the complaint.
All of the parties
filed motions for summary judgment. Pruckowski asked for judgment against the
Estate to require it to pay for the funeral. Decedent's house had been sold by this time
and the title company escrowed $50,000 that could be used to pay the Funeral Home. The Funeral Home requested judgment against the
children, the Executor and Estate for the unpaid balance of the funeral or the
value of its services. The Executor and
Estate asked for summary judgment against the children.
Following oral
argument on May 5, 2015, the trial court reserved on the motions. While the decision was pending, Pruckowski
filed a motion to assert a cross-claim for indemnification[1]
against the Estate and Executor, because he contended they had an obligation
under the Will to pay the funeral expenses and had not done so.
On July 6, 2015,
the trial judge granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home and against the
children, granted the Estate and Executor's summary judgment motion against the
children, and denied Pruckowski's motion for summary judgment. The court rejected Pruckowski's argument that
he was subjected to duress through "wrongful pressure" by the Funeral
Home because "it was expected the funeral arrangements would require a
payment." Then, the court found the
children were financially responsible for the cost of the funeral arrangements,
as they had "knowingly chose[n] to incur the $30,000 expense of a funeral
on their own." The trial judge reasoned
that the Executor, as the decedent's brother, had legal authority to direct the
funeral under N.J.S.A. 45:27-22 because the children, whose rights would
have been superior under the statute, had been left out of the Will, rendering
invalid their "right to control the funeral" under the statute.
The court denied Pruckowski's
motion to assert a cross-claim because both the Will and the "Payment
Policy" were "clear and unambiguous," making "futile"
any cross-claim Pruckowski could assert against the Estate. The order denying the amendment was entered on
July 15, 2015. Thereafter, on September
15, 2015,[2]
a judgment for $30,416.10 was entered against the children, jointly and
severally, in favor of the Funeral Home.[3]
Pruckowski appeals only the order that denied
his motion to amend the pleadings, claiming the court erred by denying his
ability to seek indemnification from the Estate.
We agree the trial
court erred by denying the motion to amend the pleadings to include a
cross-claim for indemnification against the Estate, and in finding the children
had no right to control the funeral under N.J.S.A. 45:27-22. Generally, "motions for leave to amend
[under R. 4:9-2 are to] be granted liberally." Kernan v. One Wash. Park Urban Renewal
Assocs., 154 N.J. 437, 456 (1998). "The determination of a motion to amend a
pleading is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court . . .
." Franklin Med. Assocs. v.
Newark Pub. Sch., 362 N.J. Super. 494, 506 (App. Div. 2003). That "exercise of discretion will not be
disturbed on appeal, unless it constitutes a 'clear abuse of discretion.'"
Ibid. (quoting Salitan v. Magnus, 28 N.J.
20, 26 (1958)). "When the trial
court's order is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law,
however, such deference is inappropriate."
Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 454, 459 (App.
Div. 2008) (citation omitted), certif. denied, 197 N.J. 476
(2009).
In determining
whether to allow the amendment of a pleading, courts must determine "[w]hether
the non-moving party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment
would nonetheless be futile." Notte
v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501 (2006). Decisions on motions for leave to amend "must
be made in light of the factual situation existing at the time [the] motion is
made." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). See Verni ex rel.
Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc. of N.J., 387 N.J. Super. 160, 196
(App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 189 N.J. 429 (2007); Bldg.
Materials Corp. of Am. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 424 N.J. Super. 448,
485 (citing Kimmel v. Dayrit, 154 N.J. 337, 343 (1998)), certif.
denied, 212 N.J. 198 (2012). "[C]ourts
are free to refuse leave to amend when the newly asserted claim is not
sustainable as a matter of law." Notte,
supra, 185 N.J. at 501 (citation omitted).
The trial court's decision
to deny the amendment to add a claim for indemnification was based on the
mistaken notion that the children could not control the funeral because no
provision for them had been made in the Will. N.J.S.A. 45:27-22(a) provides that if a
testator appoints a person "to control the funeral and disposition of the
human remains, the funeral and disposition shall be in accordance with the
instructions of the person so appointed."
However, if no such person has been appointed, and no other direction
has been given by a court, then the statute sets forth a hierarchy of
individuals to control the funeral and disposition of remains. Specifically,
[i]f the decedent has not left a will appointing a person
to control the funeral and disposition of the remains, the right to control the
funeral and disposition of the human remains shall be in the following order,
unless other direction has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction:
(1) The
surviving spouse of the decedent of the surviving domestic partner.
(2) A majority
of the surviving adult children of the decedent.
(3) The surviving
parent or parents of the decedent.
(4) A majority
of the brothers and sisters of the decedent.
(5) Other next
of kin of the decedent according to the degree of consanguinity.
(6) If there are
no known living relatives, a cemetery may rely on the written authorization of
any other person acting on behalf of the decedent.
[N.J.S.A. 45:27-22(a).]
Here, the court found that "[b]ecause
the children are explicitly written out of the will . . . the statute clearly
indicates that [brother] had the legal authority to direct the funeral."
In interpreting a
statute, "we look first to the plain language of the statute, seeking
further guidance only to the extent that the Legislature's intent cannot be
derived from the words that it has chosen." Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315,
329 (2009) (quoting Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J.
251, 264 (2008)). In Marino, the
Court found that as originally enacted in 1971, the interment statute,
created a hierarchy as among survivors for purposes of
determining which of them would be authorized to control the disposition of
remains. At the same time, however, the
statute expressed a preference for carrying out the wishes of the decedent by
referring to the right of the decedent to give directions and by authorizing
others to act only in the absence of such directions.
[Id. at 324 (citation omitted).]
This enumeration was necessary to
make clear "who may decide on burial . . . to avoid, or to end quickly,"
disputes regarding burial. Id. at
332.
Decedent's Will
could have named a person to control the funeral arrangements, but did not give
any direction about interment nor mention whether the children were barred from
participation. The Will only provided
for payment of "just debts and funeral expenses." Because her Will did not name a funeral
agent, the statutory hierarchy applied.
As the surviving adult children of the decedent, the children had a
higher priority right to control the funeral than decedent's brother, the
Executor. See N.J.S.A.
45:27-22(a)(2), (4).
There is nothing
in the statute providing that the statutory hierarchy shall be modified based
on whether the children inherit under the will.
Their exclusion from the Will could reflect decedent's charitable
nature, that the children were provided for otherwise during decedent's
lifetime, or that they did not require a bequest. Here, the court simply assumed because the
children were not provided for that they were not entitled to priority under
the statute. Thus, because the children
had the statutory right to decide the funeral arrangements, the court erred in
concluding that Pruckowsky's proposed amendment seeking indemnification was
futile.
There was no
prejudice to the Estate or Executor by permitting an amendment to include a claim
for indemnification. Here, "the newly asserted claims [were] based on the
same underlying facts and events set forth in the original pleading." Notte,
supra, 185 N.J. at 501. Where
the newly asserted claims are grounded on the same conduct already alleged, the
opposing party has "no cause to complain." Ibid.
The Estate acknowledged its obligation to pay reasonable funeral
expenses. There was no apparent trial
date and the litigation was relatively new.
Under the Will, the
decedent directed that her "just debts and funeral expenses" be fully
paid and satisfied. It was the Executor's
task to "settle and distribute the estate . . . in accordance with the
terms of any . . . will." N.J.S.A.
3B:10-23. This obligation included the
payment of funeral expenses. With that
said, however, when a third person makes funeral arrangements for a decedent at
the expense of the estate, "all of the authorities uniformly hold that the
expenses incurred must be reasonable." Haeberle v. Weber, 56 N.J. Super.
428, 433 (Law Div. 1959). In Haeberle,
a wife unilaterally made funeral arrangements for her husband, but the Estate
refused to pay for the cost, stating it was unreasonable. Id. at 430. The court held that the Estate was liable for
reasonable funeral expenses and the wife was liable for anything above what was
reasonable. Id. at 433. The cost of the funeral expenses and burial of
the decedent should take into account her "circumstances and social
condition . . . and the value of [her] estate." Ibid.
The Executor has acknowledged
an obligation by the Estate to pay for reasonable funeral expenses. However, the trial court did not find what
funeral expenses were reasonable for decedent, nor is the record sufficient for
this determination. Because of this, we
remand this issue to the trial court.
Pruckowski did not
challenge on appeal and remains obligated on the judgment entered against him
by the Funeral Home. Technically, he also
did not appeal the July 6, 2015 order that granted summary judgment to the Estate
and Executor. However, that order was
based on the erroneous conclusion that Pruckowski and his siblings could not
control the funeral and could not amend the pleadings to add a cross-claim. The underlying premise of that order was
flawed and is inconsistent with our decision.[4]
Therefore, the
July 15, 2015 order denying amendment of the pleading is reversed. To the extent the July 6, 2015 order granting
summary judgment to the Estate and Executor foreclosed Pruckowski's cross-claim
for indemnification, it is reversed. We
remand to the trial court the sole issue of determining what funeral expenses
were reasonable, the determination of which shall take into account any credit
Pruckowski may have received from the Estate's settlement with the Funeral
Home. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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[1]
The record on appeal does not include a copy of the proposed pleading.
[2]
By this time, the Estate and Executor had entered into a settlement with the Funeral
Home, rendering moot any judgment by the Funeral Home against these parties.
[3]
The judgment included an assessment of attorney's fees and deducted the amount
paid by the Estate in settlement of its claims with the Funeral Home.
[4]
See N. Jersey Neurosurgical Assocs., P.A. v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co.,
401 N.J. Super. 186, 198 (App. Div. 2008) (electing to reverse an order
not listed on the notice of appeal where it was clear that the judge's decision
was premised on a flawed legal analysis).
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